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NOTE 
A CALL FOR THE END OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF REALIGNMENT 
Jacob S. Sherkow* 
In Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 1941, the Supreme Court 
established the doctrine of realignment, requiring federal courts to 
examine the issues in dispute and realign each party as plaintiff or 
defendant if necessary. Due to the complete diversity requirement, 
realignment gave the federal courts the ability to both create and 
destroy diversity jurisdiction. Since 1941, the federal courts have 
struggled to interpret the central holding in Indianapolis, and have 
created several competing "tests" for realignment. This confusion 
has made the doctrine of realignment unworkable. Realignment-
along with each of the present tests-encourages jurisdictional 
abuses by forcing the federal courts to examine the merits of juris-
dictionally questionable cases. The doctrine also discourages party 
joinder because parties fear jurisdictionally altering realignment. 
Rather than focusing on the language of Indianapolis and the cur-
rent realignment tests, courts wary of improperly aligned pleadings 
should make use of newer jurisdictional statutes enacted after Indi-
anapolis. In light of realignment's infirmity and the availability of 
newer, effective legislation, the federal courts should wholly aban-
don the doctrine of realignment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Diversity jurisdiction has long been a bane of the federal jUdiciary. Since 
its inception, J jurists have regularly called for restrictions on its manufac-
ture, imposed a number of judicially created barriers, and called for its 
general demise.2 Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank may serve as the high 
I. u.s. CONST. art. m, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to ... Controversies ... be-
tween Citizens of different States .... "). 
2. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1954) (Frankfurter, I., 
concurring) (finding the Court's result-although correct-a "glaring perversion of the purpose to 
which the original grant of diversity jurisdiction was directed that it ought not to go without com-
ment, as further proof of the mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the 
unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction"); Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 
337 U.S. 582, 651 (1949) (Frankfurter, 1., dissenting) ("An Act for the elimination of diversity juris-
diction could fairly be called an Act for the relief of the federal courts."); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 441 (1850) (finding Constitutional Congressional limits on assignment for the purposes of 
manufacturing diversity jurisdiction); CHARLES W. ELIOT ET AL., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EFFI-
CIENCY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF lUSTICE 28 (1914) ("[Cjoncurrent jurisdiction of state and 
federal courts on the ground of diverse citizenship often causes much delay, expense, and uncer-
tainty."); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 139-47 (1985) 
(discussing the current movement toward the elimination of diversity jurisdiction); Henry 1. 
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversit)' Jurisdictioll, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 510 (1928) ("How far, 
if at all, the United States courts should be left with jurisdiction merely because the parties are citi-
zens of different states is a question which calls for critical reexamination of the practical bases of 
diversity jurisdiction."). 
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water mark for such judicially created barriers.3 In 1941, led by Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, the Supreme Court created a judicial remedy-realignment-in 
what was probably an effort to dispose of the most complex, multiparty cas-
es whose access to the federal courts was based solely on the "accident" of 
complete diversity. To aid the federal judiciary in determining whether the 
specific alignment of parties was intended to "manufacture" complete diver-
sity, the Court held as follows: 
To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an "actual," "substantial" 
controversy between citizens of different states .... Diversity jurisdiction 
cannot be conferred upon the federal courts by the parties' own determina-
tion of who are plaintiffs and who defendants. It is our duty, as it is that of 
the lower federal courts, to "look beyond the pleadings and arrange the 
parties according to their sides in the dispute." Litigation is the pursuit of 
practical ends, not a game of chess. Whether the necessary "collision of in-
terests" exists, is therefore not to be determined by mechanical rules. It 
must be ascertained from the "principal purpose of the suit," and the "pri-
mary and controlling matter in dispute.,,4 
At its core, this holding gave the federal courts the power to control their 
own dockets. The Court's request that federal courts" 'look beyond the 
pleadings and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute' ,,5 
possessed with it the ability to create and destroy complete diversity, and 
consequently, diversity jurisdiction. This is the "doctrine of realignment." 
Despite close to three-quarters of a century of precedent, the precise con-
tours of the doctrine of realignment remain unsettled. Currently, the Courts of 
Appeals are split on the proper application of Indianapolis. Perhaps finding 
the idea of "a transposition of parties" too "radical,,,6 the Second, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits look only toward the first half of Indianapolis's holding, refus-
ing to realign litigants as coparties where there is "an actual, substantial 
controversy between [them].,,7 The realignment of, or refusal to realign, co-
parties on the basis of a "substantial controversy" has become known as the 
"substantial controversy test." The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits, as well as the District Court for the District of Columbia, however, 
read Indianapolis to require realigning the parties "in accordance with the 
primary dispute in the controversy, even where a different, legitimate dis-
pute between the parties supports the original alignment."s The realignment 
3. 314 U.S. 63 (1941). 
4. [d. at 69 (citations omitted). 
5. [d. (quoting City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Say. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust 
Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905». 
6. [d. at 78 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
7. [d. at 69 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Md. Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 1994) (adopting the substantial contro-
versy test); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 657 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1981) (adopting the same); 
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 1966) (adopting the same). 
8. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1089 (6th Cir. 1992); see 
also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. A & S Mfg. Co., 48 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1995) (adopting the principal 
purpose test); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. (Crown I), 905 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 
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of parties on the basis of a singular, principal purpose of a lawsuit has be-
come known as the "principal purpose test." The First Circuit uses an 
amalgam of the two,9 while courts within Tenth and Eleventh Circuits use 
h l · 10 yet anot er ana YSIS. 
Sixty-seven years later, Indianapolis has had a perverse effect. The doc-
trine of realignment has created more room for the abuse of diversity 
jurisdiction, rather than less. The multitude of realignment tests and the cur-
rent unsettled state of the law have done little to achieve the "practical ends" 
the Court so desperately sought in Indianapolis. Modem realignment, far 
from providing federal courts the power to control their dockets, has become 
fodder for "an imaginative lawyer [to] find some adversity between [the 
parties] to achieve federal jurisdiction or to defeat it in circumstances where 
diversity jurisdiction was intended to apply." I I Clever litigants, especially 
insurance companies, have increasingly moved for realignment in order to 
create and destroy diversity jurisdiction as they see fit. 12 Today, almost half 
of realignment cases have one insurance company as a named party. 13 
Commentators roundly reject the doctrine. 14 Despite the Indianapolis 
Court's admonishment that "[l]itigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a 
game of chess,,,15 its present-day result has been directly to the contrary. 
1990) (adopting the same); Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Acton Constr. Co., 847 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(adopting the same); Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & R'ubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 
1987) (adopting the same); Saylab v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(adopting the same). 
9. U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D. Constr. Co., 860 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1988) (advocating for use of 
the substantial controversy test to determine if there are any substantial controversies that would 
prevent realignment, and then, if there are none, using the principal purpose test to realign the par-
ties). 
10. Symes v. Harris, 472 F.3d 754 (10th Cir. 2006) (realigning parties based on their "actual 
interests" in the suit); Earnest v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 475 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Ala. 2007) 
(applying the same analysis). 
It. William A. Braverman, Note, Janus Was Not a God of Justice: Realignment of Parries ill 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1117 (1993). 
12. Forty-three percent of realignment cases have at least one insurance company as a named 
party. This was calculated by first searching all published federal decisions from January I, 1998 to 
September 7, 2008 on Westlaw (database: allfeds) using the following string: "Indianapolis v. 
Chase" & Realign!". Seventy-nine results were obtained. The number of cases that included an 
insurance company as a named party was calculated from there through an examination of each 
case, yielding thirty-four cases with an insurance company as a named party. See, e.g., Thomas 
Solvent, 955 F.2d 1085 (using the principal purpose test, realigning the parties to destroy diversity); 
Siteworks Contracting Corp. v. W. Sur. Co., 461 F. Supp. 2d 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (using the sub-
stantial controversy test, realigning the parties to destroy diversity); Boland v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. 
Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (using the principal purpose test, realigning the parties 
to create diversity); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Algernon-Blair, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Ala. 
1988) (using a modified substantial controversy test, realigning the parties to create diversity). See 
generally April N. Everette, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. A&S Manufacturing Co.: 
Realignment of Parties in Diversity Jurisdiction Cases, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1979, 1979 (1996) (decry-
ing insurance companies' abuse of the doctrine). 
13. See supra note 12. 
14. See Braverman, supra note II; Everette, supra note 12. 
15. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941). 
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This Note argues that federal courts should wholly abandon the doctrine 
of realignment in light of jurisdictional statutory enactments made since 
Indianapolis. Part I discusses the history behind diversity jurisdiction that 
colored the majority opinion in Indianapolis, and examines the current state 
of the doctrine of realignment. Part II criticizes both the principal purpose 
test and the substantial controversy test as procedurally defective and un-
sound as a matter of policy. In particular, Section II.A condemns both tests 
for delving too deeply into the merits of a lawsuit to resolve the jurisdic-
tional question; Section n.B shows how the mechanics of either test 
discourage litigants from joining additional claims and parties; and Section 
II.C argues that a third realignment test seeking to avoid these traps would 
nevertheless fail for the same reasons. Part III proposes a solution: courts 
can use 28 U.S.c. § 1359, barring cases in which parties have been "im-
properly" joined, and 28 U.S.c. § 1332(c)(1), destroying complete diversity 
in "direct actions" against insurers, to curb abuses of diversity jurisdiction 
similar to those Indianapolis sought to eliminate. This Note concludes by 
calling for an end to the doctrine of realignment. 
I. THE LEGACY OF INDIANAPOUS 
Like other judicial jurisdictional remedies, the story of realignment is 
woven in the intellectual history of the power and purpose of the federal 
courts. Section LA gives a brief account of the history of diversity jurisdic-
tion. Section I.B analyzes the history of and the Court's opinion in 
Indianapolis, which gave root to the modem doctrine of realignment. 
Section I.C describes the modem schism resulting from courts' varied inter-
pretations of Indianapolis. 
A. A Brief History of Diversity Jurisdiction 
Diversity jurisdiction has met loathing, in part, because it remains fairly 
unclear why the Framers included it the Constitution. The Records of the 
Federal Convention provide little guidance on its inclusion. 16 The only satis-
factory historical explanation so far has been that the debt crisis of the 1780s 
made the Framers fearful that state courts would not allow out-of-state 
creditors to collect judgments from in-state debtors. 17 Federal jurisdiction 
was thought to rectify this problem by employing a jurist whose allegiances 
lay not to a particular state, but to the federal government. IS 
16. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601, at 
337 (2d ed. 1984) ("Neither the debates of the Constitutional Convention nor the records of the First 
Congress shed any substantial light on why diversity jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts 
by the Constitution or why the First Congress exercised its option to vest that jurisdiction in the 
federal courts."). 
17. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119, 
132-35 (2003); Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics. The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the 
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421. 
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to ... Controversies ... 
between Citizens of different States .... "); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial 
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This logic has become increasingly brittle today.19 The worry that state 
court judges have a home-state bias has simply not held up empirically.20 
Further, there is no reason to believe that federal judges would be any more 
impartial toward out-of-state defendants than state court judges would be. 
"After all, federal judges, like state court judges, are drawn from the com-
munities in which they live and work.,,21 The practical realities of the federal 
judicial nomination process-befriending a Senator-bolster this counter-
22 
argument. 
Perhaps because of this ambiguity, both Congress and the federal judici-
ary have sought to restrict the operation of diversity jurisdiction. Since its 
inception, Congress has successively restricted diversity jurisdiction by rais-
ing the amount-in-controversy requirement.23 These enactments were made 
specifically "to check ... the rising caseload of the federal courts, especially 
with regard to the federal courts' diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.,,24 
Congress has also attempted-rather unsuccessfully-to eliminate diversity 
jurisdiction in garden variety insurance actions by making an insurer a citi-
zen "of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by 
which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has its 
principal place of business.,,25 In addition, Congress has given judges some 
discretion to restrict diversity jurisdiction's operation by allowing them to 
impose costs on successful plaintiffs whose awards amount to less than the 
statutory minimum for diversity cases.26 
Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles", 
78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1802 (1992) ("[P]rimary sovereign allegiance will always distinguish state 
from federal judges [to] justify the continuation of some form of diversity jurisdiction."). 
19. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141 (1973) ("There is 
simply no analogy between today's situation and that existing in 1789 .... "). 
20. Bassett, supra note 17, at 137 ("Hard evidence of the phenomenon of local bias does not 
exist because local bias does not lend itself to empirical measurement."). 
21. Id. at 138. 
22. Alex Kozinski, So You Want to Become a Federal Judge by 35?, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 19, 
1996, at C6 ("Get to know your senators. You won't get a federal judgeship if a senator from your 
state objects, particularly if the senator belongs to the same party as the president."). 
23. judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § II, I Stat. 73, 78 (imposing a $500 amount-in-
controversy requirement); Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (raising the amount-in-
controversy requirement to $2,000); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (raising 
it to $3,000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (raising it to $10,000); 
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 
4646 (1988) (raising it to $50,000); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 
§ 205(a), 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (raising it to $75,000). 
I note that while the current amount-in-controversy is $75,000, the value of the original 
amount-in-controversy requirement, $500, would only be approximately $11,000 today. Samuel H. 
Williamson, Six Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a u.s. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present, 
MEASURING WORTH, http://www.measuringworth.comluscompare/ (last visited Sept. I, 2008). 
24. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969). 
25. 28 U.S.c. § I 332(c)(I ) (2000); see infra Section III.B (discussing the difficulty of this 
approach because of courts' narrow reading of the statute). 
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) ("[W]here the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal 
courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000 ... the 
district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff."). 
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The federal judiciary has also played a role in restricting the operation 
of diversity jurisdiction. In 1806, less than ten years after Congress passed 
the Federal Judiciary Act, Strawbridge v. Curtiss established the complete 
diversity requirement.27 Sheldon v. Sill, in 1850, found that congressional 
limitations on the assignment of claims in diversity cases were, in fact, con-
stitutional.28 The Supreme Court's affirmation of Black and White Taxicab 
Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co. in 1928, which infamously upheld fed-
eral courts' rights to create "federal common law,,,29 prompted several 
prominent jurists to begin an academic campaign against diversity jurisdic-
tion. Judge Charles E. Clark, appointed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1939 after serving as dean of Yale Law School, conducted a 
massive empirical study to undermine the use of diversity jurisdiction.30 Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter was a frequent academic contributor to attacks on 
diversity jurisdiction.31 His law school mentee, Judge Henry J. Friendly, also 
lent his pen to the cause.32 By 1941, the year Indianapolis was handed down, 
attacks against diversity jurisdiction, even from the High Court, had become 33 
common. 
B. Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank 
1. The Indianapolis Gas Crisis of 1900 
In 1900, the Indianapolis Gas Company faced a financial crisis: so many 
of its customers were stealing gas by cutting a small hole in the gas pipeline, 
a process known as "boring out," that the company was not able to pay divi-
dends to its shareholders.34 The dividend deferral caused such a stir that 
twice-ex-President Grover Cleveland, who was an Indianapolis Gas share-
holder, publicly complained.35 Maligned in the business community, 
Indianapolis Gas sought drastic measures: a bond auction secured by deeds to 
its plant property, with Chase National Bank of New York as the trustee.36 The 
City of Indianapolis, however, could not afford to wait until Indianapolis 
27. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
28. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). 
29. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
30. EDWARD A. PuRCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 79 (2000). 
31. E.g., Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-In Reply 
to Professor Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1931). 
32. E.g., Friendly, supra note 2. 
33. PuRCELL, supra note 30, at 78--81. 
34. Charge Thefts of Gas-Indianapolis Company's Reason for Deferring Dividend Action, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1900. at I. 
35. Mr. Cleveland's Gas Stocks: Ex-President a Shareholder in Indianapolis Co. and Wants 
Dividends Paid, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,1902, at I. 
36. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 70 (1941); see also Securities at Auction, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,1902, at 12. 
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Gas righted itself. And so, in 1906, the City entered into a franchise agree-
ment with the newly formed Citizens Gas Company of Indianapolis for the 
purpose of "compet[ing] with Indianapolis Gas.,,37 The agreement included a 
provision that after approximately twenty-five years, "the company should 
be wound up and its property conveyed to the City.,,38 Still struggling finan-
cially in 1913, Indianapolis Gas agreed to lease its properties to Citizens 
Gas for a ninety-nine-year term, unloading some of its bond indebtedness 
onto Citizens Gas in the process.39 Citizens Gas was still bound by its fran-
chise agreement with the city, however, and in 1935, attempted to wind up 
its business and pass off the debts it incurred from Indianapolis Gas to the 
city.40 Naturally, the city refused. Trying to resolve the dispute amicably, 
Indianapolis Gas agreed to put a certain amount of the debt in escrow while 
the city contested its agreement with Citizens Gas.41 
Chase, however, was still owed interest on Indianapolis Gas's bond is-
sue. Rather than going after the recalcitrant Indianapolis Gas alone, Chase 
sued the city, Citizens Gas, and Indianapolis Gas in Indiana federal court in 
diversity.42 Chase sought declaratory relief on the validity of the agreements 
between Indianapolis Gas and Citizens Gas, and between Citizens Gas and 
the city, giving Chase its pick of debtors.43 Indianapolis Gas and Citizens 
Gas, however, never claimed that their agreement was invalid. If there were 
any controversy at all, pled Citizens Gas, it "existed solely between Indian-
apolis Gas and the City.,,44 Realizing this to be the case, and perhaps viewing 
Chase's alignment of the parties as little more than a jurisdictional ruse, the 
district court realigned Indianapolis Gas as a plaintiff, which placed Indiana 
parties on each side, and dismissed the case for a lack of jurisdiction.45 
The circuit court, however, disagreed on appeal, holding that the "rela-
tion existing between [Chase] and the Indianapolis Company is such that the 
latter should not be realigned with [Chase),,;46 the tangled web of contracts 
virtually guaranteed that "a controversy of some proportions [was] calcu-
lated to develop.,,47 Immune to the circuit court's reprimand, the district 
court held on remand that the lease between Indianapolis Gas and Citizens 
Gas was unenforceable, and consequently, that Indianapolis Gas was alone 
in its indebtedness to Chase.48 Both Indianapolis Gas and Chase appealed to 




41. Id. at 71. 
42. Id. 
43. See id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Gas Co. (Chase f), 96 F.2d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 1938). 
47. Id. 
48. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 71-72. 
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the circuit court, which again reversed, concluding that the lease was en-
forceable, and, as a result, that all three Indiana parties owed Chase.49 The 
City of Indianapolis, now liable for debts incurred by the very gas company 
it had attempted to put out of business, successfully petitioned for certiorari 
in 1940.50 
2. The Majority Opinion 
In some respects, the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Indianapolis 
was surprising. The legal issues presented were not novel. Though the dis-
trict court and circuit court disagreed on whether the federal courts had 
jurisdiction, both agreed that the disposition of the issue arose solely from 
the interpretation of Indianapolis Gas's obligations under its own lease 
agreement.51 Nor were the facts giving rise to the litigation unique or par-
ticularly fascinating. The case was little more than a bankers' spat over the 
validity of a municipal utilities lease. Yet, the Supreme Court may have seen 
realignment, a rarely used egress from federal court, as an attractive tool 
with which to control diversity jurisdiction, and consequently, the federal 
docket. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, therefore, not to decide the 
validity of the utilities leases or the rights of foreign creditors to municipal 
debtors, but rather to decide "the important jurisdictional issue involved in 
the litigation.,,52 
This jurisdictional issue cut to the very heart of the diversity statute, 
which gave federal jurisdiction to all completely diverse civil suits in which 
the matter in controversy exceeded three thousand dollars.53 Focusing on the 
"matter in controversy" language, the Court framed the "specific question 
[as] this: Does an alignment of the parties in relation to their real interests in 
the 'matter in controversy' satisfy the settled requirements of diversity juris-
diction?,,54 With the question posed in this manner, the Court gave itself the 
opportunity to carve out an exception to diversity jurisdiction: denying ac-
cess to a district court sitting solely in diversity if the "alignment of the 
parties" was not "in relation to their real interests.,,55 The Court reasoned: 
49. Chase NaCI Bank v. Citizens Gas Co. (Chase 11),113 F.2d 217, 232 (7th Cir. 1940). 
50. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 311 U.S. 636 (1940). 
51. See Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 71 ("Finding no collision between the interests of the 
plaintiff and the interests of the Indianapolis Gas Company, the District Court realigned the latter as 
a party plaintiff .... " (internal quotation marks omitted»; Chase I, 96 F.2d at 367 ("If it be con-
ceded, however, that appellant and the Indianapolis Company occupy a similar position with respect 
to the validity and enforcement of the lease against the city, yet we think there are sufficient matters 
in controversy between them to prevent the latter from being realigned with appellant as plaintiff."). 
52. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 72. 
53. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2000» ("Of all suits of a civil nature ... where the matter in controversy exceeds ... 
three thousand dollars, and ... is between citizens of different States .... "). 
54. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69. 
55. Id. 
534 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 107:525 
To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an "actual," "substantial" 
controversy between citizens of different states .... Diversity jurisdiction 
cannot be conferred upon the federal courts by the parties' own 
determination of who are plaintiffs and who defendants. It is our duty, as it 
is that of the lower federal courts, to "look beyond the pleadings and ar-
range the parties according to their sides in the dispute." Litigation is the 
pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess. Whether the necessary "col-
lision of interests" exists, is therefore not to be determined by mechanical 
rules. It must be ascertained from the "principal purpose of the suit," and 
the "primary and controlling matter in dispute." These familiar doctrines 
governing the alignment of the parties for purposes of determining diver-
sity of citizenship have consistently guided the lower federal courts and 
this Court.56 
In light of its holding, the Court sought to "ascertain[] [only] the 'prin-
cipal purpose of the suit.' ,,57 Framed in this manner, and despite the 
complexity of the litigants' contract schemes, the Court found only a single 
question in the Indianapolis dispute: "Is the lease whereby Indianapolis Gas 
in 1913 conveyed all its gas plant property to Citizens Gas valid and binding 
upon the City?,,58 Everything else, it declared, "is window-dressing designed 
to satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.,,59 The Court concluded 
that because Indianapolis Gas and Chase had the most to gain by proving 
the lease's validity, they should be aligned: 
Chase and Indianapolis Gas are, colloquially speaking, partners in litiga-
tion .... What Chase wants, Indianapolis Gas wants, and the City does not 
want. ... Therefore ... Indianapolis Gas and Chase are on the same side 
of the controversy not only for their own purposes but also for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction.60 
Having Indianapolis Gas and Chase as coplaintiffs destroyed complete di-
versity, and erased the entire mess from the federal docket.61 
Despite nullifying ten years of litigation, the Court rebuffed concerns 
that its ruling was a "sacrifice of justice to technicality.,,62 Rather, the major-
ity found the result wrought in the "constitutional limitations upon the 
judicial power of the federal courtS.,,63 With this in mind, the Court pro-
claimed that Congress had intended "to keep [the federal courts] free for 
their distinctive federal business,,,64 and that federal courts, therefore, must 
56. [d. at 69-70 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
57. [d. at 69 (citation omitted). 
58. [d. at 72. 
59. [d. 
60. /d. at 74. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 76. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. 
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" 'scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the 
[diversity] statute has defined.' ,,65 
3. Justice Jackson's Dissent 
The majority's opinion provoked a pointed dissent from Justice Jackson, 
joined by Justices Reed, Roberts, and Stone. The dissent labeled the entire 
practice of realignment "radical," and found unbelievable the majority's pro-
nouncement that Chase and Indianapolis Gas were coparties, especially after 
the district court had awarded Chase over a million dollars, solely payable 
by Indianapolis Gas.66 The dissent reasoned that jurisdictional constraints, if 
any were to be found, cut in favor of adjudicating the case on its merits.67 In 
dissent, Justice Jackson stated: 
The plaintiff cannot rightly be deprived of the benefit of [diversity] juris-
diction, conferred upon him by laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution 
of the United States, because the court may think that such a cause of ac-
tion is relatively less important than that asserted against another 
defendant, or because one action "dominates" the other, or because one is 
more "actual" or "substantial" than the other.68 
This, the dissent concluded, was an exaggeration of the Court's role in com-
bating jurisdictional abuses, "the remedy [to which] would be found in 
Congressional withdrawal of such jurisdiction, rather than in the confusing 
process of judicial constriction.,,69 
The dissent pointed to two problems with the majority's reasoning. First, 
the majority substantively discussed the validity of the parties' contracts 
while the Court simultaneously "[held] itself to be without jurisdiction.,,70 
The dissenters found this paradoxical: If the majority's underlying concern 
was the burden of the federal docket, it seemed counterintuitive to allow 
courts to carefully weigh the substance of parties' claims when they were 
without jurisdiction.7) Second, if the majority's underlying concern was ju-
dicial efficiency, it seemed plainly wrong to deny jurisdiction to the whole 
of a lawsuit where, "[i]f the plaintiff had asserted [its] demands in two sepa-
rate actions, no one would doubt that both were within the jurisdiction of the 
District Court."n The dissent aptly concluded: "We would follow the words 
of the jurisdictional statute when it is sought to restrict its application, quite 
65. [d. at 77 (quoting Healy v. Ratla, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934». 
66. [d. at 78-79 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
67. [d. at 79-80. 
68. [d. at 80. 
69. [d. at 84. 
70. [d. at 79. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
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as faithfully as when the effort is to enlarge it by recourse to doctrines which 
conflict with its words.,,73 
C. The Schism Following Indianapolis 
The central holding in Indianapolis initially provided less than clear 
guidance to the lower courts, and ultimately led to a schism among the cir-
cuit courts. On one hand, the opinion intimated that "'collision of 
interests' " among parties was "not to be determined by mechanical ruleS.,,74 
On the other hand, whether there was a "collision of interests" was to be 
determined "from the 'principal purpose of the suit,' and the 'primary and 
controlling matter in dispute' ,,75_a rather mechanical rule. Coloring the 
lower courts' interpretations were some of the concerns voiced by the dis-
sent: that party realignment was itself "radical," that the majority's 
reasoning would wrongfully deprive litigants of the federal forum, and that 
such extreme measures of altering jurisdiction should be left to Congress, 
not the Court, to decide. 
At first, the lower courts struggled to extract a principled rule from the 
Indianapolis decision. In one of the first realignment cases after Indianapo-
lis, Thomson v. Butler, the Eighth Circuit interpreted Indianapolis to mean 
that "the court must align [the parties] for jurisdictional purposes on the ba-
sis of their actual legal interests and the apparent results to them.,,76 Where 
such language springs from Indianapolis is wholly unclear. Parties' "actual 
legal interests" are not the same as whether they possess a "collision of in-
terests," or whether a court should determine such a collision exists from the 
"principal purpose" of the suit. A later case from the Fifth Circuit made 
similar muck of the language of Indianapolis, holding "that the realignment 
cannot take place until it has been made to appear that ... [the parties'] 
rights are so identical as to necessitate their being placed on the same 
side.,,77 Yet another read "the law as set forth in the Indianapolis case [as] 
strengthen[ing] the conclusion that the parties ... must be realigned in ac-
cordance with their community of interests.,,78 
Despite these initial deviations from the text, the lower courts eventually 
narrowed their focus to the central holding in Indianapolis. Such focus, 
however, was not uniform. Several circuits focused on Indianapolis's seem-
ingly clear directive that realignment "must be ascertained from the 
73. /d. at 84. 
74. Id. at 69 (quoting City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Say. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & 
Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905)). 
75. Id. (citations omined). 
76. 136 F.2d 644,647 (8th Cir. 1943) (citing Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69, as supporting the 
construction). 
77. Thomas v. Thomas, 165 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1947). 
78. B.J. Van Ingen & Co. v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 83 F. Supp. 778, 793 
(D.N.J.1949). 
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'principal purpose of the suit.' ,,79 Some focused on the Court's pronounce-
ment over the requirement for diversity jurisdiction: "To sustain diversity 
jurisdiction there must exist an 'actual,' 'substantial' controversy between 
citizens of different states."so Yet others created similar variants. Without any 
comment from the Court since, the analyses adopted in each circuit have 
become ingrained over the years. Ironically, Indianapolis's intention to do 
away with jurisdictional artifice has given it a multitude of forms. As this 
panoply of analyses widens, it is clear that Indianapolis did little to " 'scru-
pulously confine' " diversity jurisdiction.s1 Rather, it has sacrificed justice to 
capriciousness. 
1. The Principal Purpose Test 
Currently, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits and the 
District Court for the District of Columbia use what can be described as the 
"principal purpose test" in realignment analysis.s2 Judges in these jurisdic-
tions examine the facts of a case and ascertain the" 'primary and controlling 
matter in dispute.' "S3 Based on this singular purpose, the courts then realign 
the parties according to their interest in the outcome of that matter. At least 
one court has gone so far as to perform this task "even where a different, 
legitimate dispute between the parties supports the original alignment [and] 
despite the fact that there may be actual and substantial ancillary or secon-
dary issues to the primary issue.,,84 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. A & S Manufacturing Co. pro-
vides an example of primary purpose realignment in action.s5 The 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") initially filed suit against A & S 
Manufacturing and several other firms for costs associated with environ-
mental contamination at several sites. A & S's insurance company, United 
States Fidelity and Guaranty, a Virginia corporation, then brought suit in 
Maryland federal court seeking a declaratory judgment as to its responsibili-
ties were the EPA to be successful in its suit against A & S. Its basis for 
jurisdiction was diversity: neither A & S, nor any of the other firms targeted 
by the EPA, were Virginia citizens. A & S promptly moved for realignment, 
arguing that "the principal issue in this case [is] whether any of the insurers 
owe A & S a duty to defend and/or indemnify it for the underlying environ-
mental lawsuit."s6 This had the potential to categorize A & S, along with the 
79. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69; see also cases cited supra note 8. 
80. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (citations omitted). 
81. Id. at 77 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,270 (1934». 
82. See cases cited supra note 8. 
83. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (quoting Merchs.' Cotton Press Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
151 U.S. 368, 385 (1894». 
84. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1089 (6th Cir. 1992) (cita-
tions omitted). 
85. 839 F. Supp. 347 (D. Md. 1993), aff'd, 48 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1995). 
86. Id. at 350. 
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other firms cited by the EPA, as defendants, and the insurance companies as 
plaintiffs. Shared New Jersey citizenship between A & S and another of the 
insurance companies, therefore, threatened to destroy jurisdiction. Looking 
toward United States Fidelity's own admission that the purpose of the suit 
was "[to] determin[e] questions of actual controversy between the parties,,,S1 
the district court agreed with A &. S that the primary purpose in the suit was 
to determine the various insurance companies' duties toward the polluters, 
and that "disputes that may exist among the insurers are simply ancillary to 
the primary issue of the rights and obligations set forth in the liability insur-
ance contracts."ss Upon this determination, the court realigned the parties 
and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
2. The Substantial Controversy Test 
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, however, have adopted the 
"substantial controversy test.,,89 This analysis focuses only on the first part of 
the central holding in Indianapolis, "sustain[ing] diversity jurisdiction [only 
when] there [is] an 'actual,' 'substantial' controversy between citizens of 
different states.,,90 Courts employing the substantial controversy test examine 
whether there is an "actual" or "substantial" conflict between adverse liti-
gants, and, if the answer is "Yes," refuse realignment of any of the parties. 
The substantial controversy test is thought to avoid the rigors of the princi-
pal purpose test, which ultimately constricts even the most complex 
litigation into a single-issue posture. At the same time, it gives the courts 
almost unlimited leeway in determining what conflicts count as "actual" or 
"substantial" enough to sustain jurisdiction. 
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Trane Co. serves as the seminal 
case in applying substantial controversy analysis.9) Trane, a Wisconsin sub-
contractor, was in the business of selling large quantities of heat exchanger 
units for cars.92 After a contract dispute gone awry, Trane's principal insurer, 
American Motorists from Illinois, brought a declaratory action in Wisconsin 
federal court against Trane and several of Trane's other insurers.93 One of 
Trane's insurers, American Home, was on the verge of settling the contract 
dispute, and in an effort to dispose of the declaratory action, moved to re-
align another of Trane's insurers, Employers Insurance from Wisconsin, as a 
plaintiff.94 This would have placed Trane and Employers, both from 
87. Id. at 351 (a!terations in original) (quoting Complaint at'll I, A & S Manu! Co., 839 F. 
Supp.347). 
88. /d. at 350. 
89. See cases cited supra note 7. 
90. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63,69 (1941) (citations omitted). 
91. 657 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1981). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 149. 
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Wisconsin, on opposite sides of the suit, and destroyed jurisdiction. Finding 
the principal purpose of the suit to be between Trane and all of its insurers, 
the district court obliged American Home and consequently dismissed the 
declaratory action.95 On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit found the dis-
missal unwarranted: American Motorists had established at least some 
controversy between it and each of the defendants, enough to sustain an ac-
tion in diversity. With little discussion, the court adopted the substantial 
controversy test and reversed, declaring: "Realignment is proper when the 
court finds that no actual, substantial controversy exists between parties on 
one side of the dispute and their named opponents.,,96 Because there was, in 
fact, an actual and substantial controversy between American Motorists and 
the defendants, realignment seemed improper.97 The court brushed away 
arguments that realignment should be determined by the parties' "attitude,,98 
toward the controversy, stating: "It does not follow that a court must realign 
a party whenever it shares an interest with an opposing party.,,99 Rather, "it is 
the points of substantial antagonism, not agreement, on which the realign-
. ,,100 
ment questIOn must tum. 
3. Variants of Either Test 
Other circuits have created two variants of realignment analysis. The 
First Circuit has recently adopted an amalgam of both tests in what can 
be called a "principal-purpose-first-substantial-controversy-second test." 101 
Courts in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, meanwhile, have adopted an 
"actual interests test.,,102 Both analyses, while purporting to be grounded in 
Indianapolis, have little textual support. Neither, moreover, drastically alters 
the calculus for party realignment as compared to principal purpose or 
substantial controversy analyses. 
In U.S.l. Properties Corp. v. M.D. Construction Co., the First Circuit de-
clared that on a motion for realignment "[o]ur task is to determine 'the 
primary and controlling matter in dispute' and then determine whether any 
actual collision in interests remains.,,103 This analysis combines both the 
principal purpose and substantial controversy test, potentially realigning on 
principal purpose grounds only after passing the case through the spectrum 
of substantial controversy analysis. The court cites no cases other than 
95. /d. at ISO. 
96. Id. at 149. 
97. Id. at lSI. 
98. Id. at ISO; see also Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'! Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 75 n.4 (1941) (quot-
ing Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199,204 (1918)). 
99. Tralle, 657 F.2d at ISO. 
100. Id. at lSI. 
101. See U.S.1. Props. Corp. v. M.D. Constr. Co., 860 F.2d 1,4-6 (lst Cir. 1988). 
102. E.g., Symes v. Harris, 472 F.3d 754 (10th Cir. 2006); Earnest v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 475 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Ala. 2007). 
103. U.S.I. Props. Corp., 860 F.2d at 4 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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Indianapolis for this proposition. I04 Ruling on a case concerning a construc-
tion contract gone awry, the court found that the principal purpose of the 
suit was to determine "[which] party [was] ultimately responsible for the 
breach.,,1D5 This, combined with a settlement agreement between the plaintiff 
and one of the defendants, made two of the parties, U.S.I. and M.D. "'part-
ners in litigation.' ,,106 
It does not appear that such an approach resolves the issue of realign-
ment any differently than the substantial controversy test alone. Because the 
court is ultimately basing its decision to realign parties on "whether any 
actual collision in interests remains,,,lo7 it matters little how it decides the 
question of the suit's principal purpose.108 
Courts within the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, however, ask the follow-
ing question: Are the parties "aligned to match their actual interests?"I09 A 
2006 case from the Tenth Circuit examined a shareholders' derivative law-
suit brought against a corporation, REL, and several outside investors. 11D In 
an effort to preserve diversity, the plaintiffs moved to realign the corporation 
as an involuntary plaintiff. The district court denied the motion, dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction, and plaintiffs appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed, 
holding that realignment was proper because the plaintiffs' and the corpora-
tion's "actual interests" were identical. The court stated: 
This case presents the ideal set of facts for aligning REL as a plaintiff. 
REL is owned entirely by the plaintiffs. There is no one within the com-
pany that would oppose bringing the suit, and REL's legal position would 
be aligned against the defendants' interests. Moreover, unlike in many de-
rivative lawsuits, the defendants are not officers or directors within the 
company being joined. The defendants ... have opposite financial and le-
gal interests in this litigation. Thus, the nature of the controversy would 
permit styling REL as a plaintiff. 111 
Despite relying on Indianapolis to make such a move, the court did not in-
clude any mention as to whether such an action was based on the principal 
purpose of the suit, or whether a substantial controversy existed between the 
corporation and the shareholders. Rather, it looked toward a nebulous but 
practical concept of a relationship between the parties, so close that one's 
grievance may effectively have been called the other's. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. (emphasis added). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Thanks to Professor Gil Seinfeld for this suggestion. 
109. Symes v. Harris, 472 F.3d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Earnest 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 475 F. Supp. 2d II \3, 1117 (N.D. Ala. 2007) ("It is clear to this Court 
that [defendant] Thomas has actual interests that are closely aligned with [plaintiff] Mr. 
Earnest's ... therefore realignment is necessary." (emphasis added)). 
110. Symes, 472 F.3d 754. 
Ill. Id. at 761 (emphases added). 
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II. REALIGNMENT ENCOURAGES, RATHER THAN PREVENTS, 
JURISDICTIONAL ABUSES 
541 
Rather than providing the federal courts with the discretion needed to 
dispose of speciously pled multiparty lawsuits, Indianapolis and the various 
doctrines of realignment have encouraged new jurisdictional abuses. Spe-
cifically, principal purpose and substantial controversy analyses force both 
courts and litigants to engage in jurisdictional strategizing that ultimately 
defeats several underlying mechanisms of judicial efficiency. Section II.A 
demonstrates that under either regime, courts must address difficult, sub-
stantive issues of the parties' claims simply to determine the supposedly 
simpler jurisdictional questions. Section II.B argues that the Indianapolis 
standards frustrate the purpose behind procedural rules designed to preserve 
judicial economy, namely those allowing for liberal claim and party joinder. 
Section Il.e posits that an alternative realignment test will likely fail for 
similar reasons. 
A. Realignment Forces Courts to Address Difficult Questions of Substance 
Simply to Determine Easier Questions of Jurisdiction 
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is an absolute necessity for a federal 
court to hear the case before it. "Without [it,] the court cannot proceed at all 
in any cause.,,112 As a procedural outgrowth of this directive, federal courts 
have long addressed the jurisdictional question before any others. 113 This 
habit does not arise simply from a desire for docket control, in an effort by 
federal courts to avoid wasting time examining cases upon which they 
would be powerless to act, but" 'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the 
judicial power of the United States' and is 'inflexible and without excep-
tion.' ,,114 Any determination of the substance of a case while jurisdiction is 
in doubt "is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires."lIs To avoid 
this, courts often confine an examination of the jurisdictional question to the 
face of the pleadings. 116 Difficulty in assessing jurisdiction, therefore, does 
not usually permit the courts to consider the substance, as opposed to the 
validity, of claims. I 17 
112. Ex pane McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). 
113. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (entertaining a his-
torical discussion on jurisdiction being "established as a threshold matter"). 
114. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 
III U.S. 379, 382 (1884». 
115. Id. at 102. 
116. E.g., Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. I, 20 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("Federal jurisdiction is ordinarily determined-invariably determined, except for Avco and 
Taylor-on the basis of what claim is pleaded, rather than on the basis of what claim can prevail."). 
117. See Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. at 99-102. 
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Indianapolis's command, to "'look beyond the pleadings' ... for pur-
poses of determining diversity [jurisdiction],,,118 therefore remains a curious 
one. It is odd that the Court, in its effort to " 'scrupulously confine [its] own 
jurisdiction to the precise limits' ,,119 of the diversity statute, would engage in 
a practice that accidentally expanded those limits. This concern was not lost 
on the minority, who commented that "whether either of [two] rights as-
serted is more substantial than the other depends on the outcome of the 
litigation, which can hardly be used to determine jurisdiction which must 
exist at the beginning of the litigation.,,12o Realignment's expansion of diver-
sity jurisdiction has been made worse by the current adoption of the 
principal purpose and substantial controversy tests, both of which force the 
courts to make substantive legal conclusions in the face of questionable ju-
risdiction. 
1. The Principal Purpose Test 
The principal purpose test requires the court to determine" 'the primary 
and controlling matter in dispute.' ,,121 At its core, this requires the court to 
weigh the parties' claims; to choose from a complicated web of litigation a 
single "dominating controversy" and to declare the rest "window-
dressing.,,122 This can hardly be accomplished by only looking at the plead-
ings. Complaints rarely conclude by stating, for example: "Plaintiff would 
like to impress upon the Court that Count Three is its principal purpose for 
litigating." The court must look beyond the rather straightforward question 
of claim validity-as discussed, its usual line of inquiry for jurisdictional 
questions-and ask the much more nebulous question of "What's really go-
ing on here?" Such a determination is invariably one of substance as 
opposed to procedure. 
Consider the following scenario: A, a resident of state Z, is the owner of 
a condo worth $1,000,000. A's condo is managed by A's condo association, 
B, incorporated in state Z. B holds an insurance policy for the benefit of A 
bought from C, an insurance company incorporated in state Y. One day, A's 
condo bums down. A tries to collect from B but because of some hard and 
possibly illegal bargaining from C, B offers A only $500,000. A then sues B 
for breaching its duty of care, as is required by it in the condominium agree-
ment, and C for its possibly illegal tactics in dealing with B, both in state 
court. Wanting to litigate in federal court, C then removes the case to federal 
court, arguing that the principal purpose of the suit is for A to collect from 
C, and therefore, B should be made a plaintiff. This would create complete 
118. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1941) (citation omitted). 
119. /d. at 77 (quoting Healy v. Raila, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934». 
120. [d. at 80 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
121. [d. at 69 (majority opinion) (quoting Merchs.' Cotton Press Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
151 U.S. 368, 385 (1894». 
122. [d. at 72. 
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diversity-A and B, residents of Z, as plaintiffs; C, a resident of Y, as defen-
dant-and, therefore, federal jurisdiction. 
To determine the "principal purpose" in this suit, if there is one, the 
court must initially examine the following: the condominium agreement, the 
insurance policy, and any relevant state law as to whether C's alleged nego-
tiation tactics are actionable. After a thorough examination of these, the 
court then must speculate, and rule, as to what A's motivations were in 
bringing the suit in the first place. Revisiting the principle that all that is 
required to bring a diversity claim is complete diversity between plaintiffs 
and defendants, and that the plaintiff has pled at least the amount-in-
controversy, this seems like a significant, and wholly unnecessary, amount 
of work. If we take the above hypothetical and add another insurance com-
pany, the court might find itself entangled in a discussion of partial liability 
simply to answer what is otherwise a two-part jurisdictional question. As 
cases become increasingly complicated, a court applying the principal pur-
pose test must engage more and more deeply into resolving complicated 
questions of fact and law. 123 
Analyses like these upset the twin reasons federal courts tread carefully 
where jurisdictional ground is thin: the federal courts' power and docket 
control. In the hypothetical above, the legality of C's actions does not speak 
to either of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. It seems strange, 
then, to require the courts to employ a test to decide an issue that is only 
tangential to either question. More practically, forcing courts to undergo the 
rigor of such analyses defeats the purpose of using jurisdiction as a docket 
control device. Constitutional authority aside, if federal courts are forced to 
undergo such protracted determinations to determine jurisdiction, the inter-
ests of judicial efficiency dictate that the courts might as well just try the 
whole of every case. 
Admittedly, not every case is complex, and sometimes the principal pur-
pose of the suit is, in fact, readily apparent. But analyses that directly take this 
into consideration only complicate the problem. If courts were to adopt the 
principal purpose approach, but only when a principal purpose was readily 
discemable, courts then must engage in yet another lengthy determination: 
whether the principal purpose is resolved enough to be clearly seen. This 
surely does no better than a principal purpose analysis alone. In any event, 
courts would still have to undergo substantive legal determinations simply to 
answer straightforward jurisdictional questions. 
2. The Substantial Controversy Test 
The substantial controversy test similarly violates principles of jurisdic-
tional jurisprudence by forcing courts to engage in time-wasting analysis in 
order to answer a question designed to reduce the workload of the courts. 
123. See, e.g., Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984) (examining a 
plaintiff's settlement agreement and whether a plaintiff's claim was restricted by the remedies pro-
vided in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act simply to determine the suit's 
principal purpose). 
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The analysis requires that, for realignment to proceed, "no actual, substan-
tial controversy exists between parties on one side of the dispute and their 
named opponents.,,124 Just as the principal purpose test requires courts to 
conjure up a "principal" reason for litigation, the substantial controversy test 
requires courts to validate the absence of a "substantial" claim between two 
hypothetically aligned parties. This analysis, in tum, often rests on the mer-
its of the parties' claims, and the court must make the determination for 
every possible permutation of parties in the suit. l25 
Ironically, the substantial controversy test arose as an alternative to the 
rigors of a principal purpose test. Compared to principal purpose analysis, 
the Second Circuit has lauded the substantial controversy test as "more 
flexible because it permits courts deciding whether diversity exists to con-
sider the multiple interests and issues involved in the litigation.,,126 This 
flexibility, however, is precisely its defect. A test which "permits courts ... 
to consider the multiple interests and issues involved in the litigation,,127 
holds anathema the principle that federal courts should be restrained from 
delving into the merits of a case simply to decide the jurisdictional question. 
Courts uncomfortable with the principal purpose test's "single-issue pos-
ture,,128 would do no better in attempting to limit their jurisdictional inquiries 
under the substantial controversy test. If courts must spend their time on 
philosophizing the parties' internal reasons for litigation, one dissertation is 
better than many. Under these circumstances, the substantial controversy 
test becomes exponentially more difficult as the parties join additional liti-
gants and claims. A substantial controversy regime may very well require 
substantive legal analysis for every possible claim per two-party permuta-
tion. 
Much of the support for the substantial controversy test derives from a 
desire to "ensure that the case truly involves the kind of adversarial relation-
ship constitutionally required in a case or controversy in the federal 
courtS.,,129 To be sure, the Constitution does demand that federal courts may 
only hear actual "cases or controversies.,,13o But linking the substantial con-
troversy test to the case or controversy requirement speciously equates the 
word "controversy" in the two contexts. First, the constitutionally demanded 
case or controversy requirement speaks only to the justiciability of an 
124. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 657 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1981). 
125. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998); Md. Cas. Co. v. 
WR. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1994); Trane, 657 F.2d at 149. 
126. Md. Cas. Co., 23 F.3d at 622. 
127. [d. (emphasis added). 
128. [d. 
129. [d. (quoting I JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 'II 0.74[1], at 771 
(2d ed. 1996)). 
130. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority ... [and] to Controversies .... "); see also 13 WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 16, at § 3529. 
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action; whether "[a] 'controversy' in [the constitutional] sense must be one 
that is appropriate for judicial determination." 131 Substantial controversy 
analysis makes no such determination, examining only whether a contro-
versy is substantial enough to "render[] realignment 'inappropriate and 
impermissible.' ,,132 These definitions of "controversy" speak past each other: 
a controversy may be constitutionally appropriate for adjudication but not 
substantial enough to prevent realignment, or substantial enough to prevent 
realignment but otherwise constitutionally inappropriate for judicial deter-
mination. 133 Second, whereas limiting federal courts' power to hear only 
actual cases or controversies seeks to conserve judicial resources, expanding 
courts' pre-adjudicatory determinations to substantial controversies encour-
ages waste. It is one thing to see if a controversy actually exists; it is another 
to see whether every controversy is substantial enough to prevent party re-
alignment. 
B. Realignment Disincentivizes Efficient Party Joinder 
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") 
in 1938, one of the primary grievances with litigation in the United States 
was procedural inefficiency.'34 A substantial purpose of the Rules was to "to 
obviate a multiplicity of suits and to provide economy, efficiency and con-
venience in judicial procedure.,,135 Even the Rules themselves dictate that 
"[t]hey should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.,,136 In particular, the Rules con-
cerning liberal claim and party joinder ardently strive to achieve these goals, 
and promote judicial economy by essentially letting litigants throw it all to 
the wall to see what sticks. Charles Alan Wright, of Federal Practice and 
Procedure fame, advised: "if there is any reason why bringing in another 
party or another claim might get matters settled faster, or cheaper, or more 
justly, then join them.,,137 Unfortunately, neither the principal purpose test 
nor the substantial controversy test affords courts the opportunity to heed 
Wright's advice. With the prospect of realignment over litigants' heads, both 
tests create serious, strategic joinder conflicts sought to be eliminated by the 
Rules. 
131. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (citing Osborn v. Bank of the 
U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 819 (1824)). 
132. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3607 n.51 
(Supp. 2008) (quoting Syms, Inc. v. illI Sec. Serv., Inc., 586 E Supp. 53, 56 (S.D.N. Y. 1984)). 
133. Haworth, 300 U.S. at 240. 
134. See, e.g., ELIOT ET AL., supra note 2, at 18-28. 
135. Robinson Bros. & Co. v. Tygart Steel Prods. Co., 9 ER.D. 468, 469 (W.D. Pa. 1949). 
136. FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
137. Charles Alan Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modem Pleading Rules, 36 
MINN. L. REv. 580, 632 (1952). 
546 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 107:525 
1. Party Joinder 
The Rules allow the litigants to join additional parties liberally, be they 
plaintiffs or defendants. 138 In particular, Rule 20 allows the joinder of both 
plaintiffs and defendants on the basis of any claim "arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.,,139 Where it 
may appear that outside parties do not wish to join in the instant litigation, 
Rule 19 requires joinder in certain cases and grants courts broad discretion 
in determining whether they are plaintiffs or defendants. l40 These rules 
command a rather expansive concept of judicial entitlement, raising only a 
short hurdle for outside parties to enter the litigation. The rules on party 
joinder set such a low bar for entry in order to "promote trial convenience 
and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple 
lawsuits.,,141 Even the Supreme Court has called for "entertaining the broad-
est possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of 
claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.,,142 
Judicial expediency, however, does not trump the jurisdictional require-
ment of complete diversity; parties whose joinder destroys complete 
diversity abrogate federal jurisdiction. 143 Therefore, when considering join-
der in a diversity action, movants must weigh their preference for the federal 
forum against the relief they are seeking. The inquiry is a relatively simple 
one: if joinder would not affect jurisdiction, then it should proceed; if it 
would, then the party seeking to join another may want to reconsider. 
The doctrine of realignment, however, complicates this analysis, and ul-
timately discourages some joinder. Even where the original alignment of 
parties would satisfy complete diversity, litigants seeking to join additional 
parties subject themselves to potential diversity-destroying realignment. 
Where two parties are citizens of the same state, each instance of joinder has 
the potential to destroy jurisdiction. Rather than promoting judicial econ-
omy, the Indianapolis doctrines discourage litigants from litigating the 
entire "transaction or occurrence" by failing to join parties who, despite the 
litigants' best intentions, may fall on the wrong side of the "v." 
We can examine this puzzle using the hypothetical from Section II.A.I. 
Imagine now that A sues C alone in federal court on diversity. C prefers state 
court, but since A meets the diversity and amount-in-controversy require-
ments, there is little C can do. After some discovery, however, A realizes that 
he may also have a claim against B for failing in its duty of care in negotiat-
ing with C. Because A believes B's duties require it to pursue A's claims, A 
138. FED. R. C1v. P. 20. 
139. Id. 
140. FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2) (,'A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made either 
a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff."). 
141. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1652 (3d ed. 
2001) (footnotes omitted). 
142. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). 
143. 28 U.S.c. § 1367 (2000); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
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joins B as an involuntary coplaintiff under Rule 19.144 C, desiring to litigate 
in state court, then moves for B to be realigned as a defendant, which, given 
that A and B are both citizens of state Z, would destroy diversity. 
C's motion can be supported easily under a principal purpose regime. C 
may argue, for example, that the principal purpose of the suit is ultimately 
for A to recover for his condo fire. Whether the recovery is predicated on 
C's failure to negotiate in good faith with B, or B's failure in its duty of care 
to A, either can be construed as secondary to A's desired outcome, an "ancil-
lary or secondary issue[] to the primary issue.,,14s This falls squarely within 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuit's language that a plaintiff's recovery is the 
principal purpose of similar lawsuits, making issues of duty or indemnifica-
. d 146 hon secon ary. 
This same maneuvering is possible under a substantial controversy re-
gime. Here, C may argue that because B has not lodged any claim against it, 
there is not a "substantial controversy" between them, and therefore, re-
alignment is appropriate. C may argue further that because B is joined as an 
involuntary plaintiff, B's reluctance to join in claims against C can hardly be 
considered a substantial controversy, even if such a controversy does exist. 
This comports with the reasoning behind a substantial controversy regime. 
Should the court find "that no actual, substantial controversy exists be-
tween,,147 Band C, realignment could very well proceed, and diversity would 
be destroyed. In the end, C's strong state-forum preference coupled with the 
hopelessly equivocal language of the various realignment doctrines discour-
ages A from joining B, despite A's legitimate belief that without B acting as 
a coplaintiff, "the court cannot accord complete relief.,,148 
2. Claim Joinder 
Rule 18(a), perhaps the superlative example of liberal joinder, allows a 
party to "join ... as many claims as it has against an opposing party.,,149 
Joined claims under Rule 18(a) need not arise from the same transaction or 
occurrence. ISO Once jurisdiction has been properly established, "there is no 
restriction on the claims that may be joined in actions brought in the federal 
144. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2) ("A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made 
either a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff."). 
145. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1089 (6th Cir. 1992). 
146. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. A & S Mfg. Co., 48 F.3d 131, 134 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The dispute 
among ... insurers is secondary to whether [they] are liable to [the plaintiffi and is hypothetical 
until the insurers' liability is determined."); Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
819 F.2d 1519, 1523 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the primary issue rested in the plaintiff's 
desire for recovery, despite a dispute over whether plaintiff's insurance company would indemnify 
it). 
147. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 657 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1981). 
148. FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a)(1 )(A). 
149. FED. R. CIv. P. 18(a). 
150. 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1582 (2d ed. 
1990). 
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courtS.,,151 The policy behind liberal claim joinder rules, like that behind 
party joinder rules, is motivated by "economy and the avoidance of waste, 
efficiency and the reduction of delay, fairness to parties, and the need for 
complete and final disposition through the avoidance of 'piecemeal deci-
sions.' ,,152 
Despite these virtues, the rule becomes vice for the strategic minded. 
Rule 18(a)'s underlying policy concerns do little to influence parties for 
whom waste, inefficiency, delay, unfairness, or the potential for multiple, 
conflicting decisions may confer some advantage. While joinder under Rule 
18(a) is not mandatory, the doctrine of claim preclusion discourages parties 
from such strategies by "prevent[ing] litigation of all grounds for, or de-
fenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless 
of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.,,153 
Rule 13(a) adds muscle to the doctrine by making compulsory "any claim 
... the pleader has against an opposing party if [it] arises out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.,,154 
Thus, parties seeking to circumvent Rule 18(a)'s invitation for expediency 
may not later raise claims from the same cause of action that they could 
have brought before the court in a prior proceeding. The doctrine does not 
preclude all unlitigated claims, however, and "the preclusive scope of a 
judgment [ultimately] depends on defining the breadth of the claim or cause 
of action hazarded in the first suit.,,155 Nevertheless, the efficiency, expedi-
ency, and permissibility of joining claims, combined with the threat of 
preclusion, greatly incentivizes parties to bring all they have before the court 
in a single lawsuit. 156 
Both Indianapolis doctrines throw a wrench in this process by discour-
aging parties from joining all of their available claims. Facing the threat of 
realignment, and a potential corresponding change in forum, parties must 
scrutinize which claims they bring forward lest the court construe their in-
tentions for expediency as a distraction from the reason they came to court 
in the first place. In a principal purpose jurisdiction, parties may be hesitant 
to litigate all of their available claims in the fear that their "additional" 
claims will water down their "principal" claim, risking an undesirable re-
alignment around the nexus of an "additional" claim. Since realignment 
proceeds on what the court deems the principal purpose, "even where a 
151. Id. 
152. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 560 A.2d 1169, 1173 (N.J. 1989). 
153. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). 
154. FED R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
155. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 18 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406, at 
141 (2d ed. 2002). 
156. See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 954-56 
(1998) (discussing the effects of preclusive doctrines on joinder); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Ex-
amination Before and Behind the "Entire Controversy" Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 7, 24 (1996) 
("Standard res judicata and joinder doctrines and standard litigating incentives under permissive 
joinder rules handle most problems quite adequately."). 
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different, legitimate dispute between the parties supports the original align-
ment,,,157 parties may be concerned that different, legitimate disputes joined 
simply for convenience will be construed as the principal claim. Further, 
where the party seeking to join additional claims may have several different, 
legitimate disputes, the risk of wrongful realignment substantially increases. 
Taking the facts from the condo fire hypothetical, we can imagine a 
situation where A sues Band C in state court for one claim each. After A 
ftles his suit, A realizes that he may be able to recover from C for additional 
harms, but that B's liability rests only on A's sole claim against B. A joins 
additional claims in order to increase his chances of recovery against C, but 
joins no additional claims against B. C then ftles for removal to federal court 
on the theory that the principal purpose of A's suit is to recover the fire 
damage to his condo from C, and that B has no interest in whether or not A 
recovers. As proof, C demonstrates to the court the litany of claims A brings 
against C compared to the single claim A brings against B. A must now 
choose whether -to litigate in federal court or to risk claim preclusion in an 
effort to avoid the federal forum. 
The substantial controversy test also affects parties' incentives to join 
additional claims, though less so than does the principal purpose test. Under 
a substantial controversy regime, coparties are discouraged from joining 
cross-claims against each other lest an opposing party use the conflict as a 
basis for realignment. Substantial claims against coparties, even where their 
disputes against the opposing parties are legitimate, could be construed to 
indicate that a substantial controversy exists between the coparties, thus not 
precluding realignment of the coparties as adverse parties. Where the issue 
is close, courts may engage in a weighing test concerning the number of 
claims, rather than their substance. Thus where ten claims are lodged be-
tween coparties A and B, each of whom has a single claim against defendant 
C, courts may be inclined to define a greater substantial controversy in the 
coparties' cross-claims than in the two claims against C. 
These concerns are not mere theory. In the most complex of cases, with 
numerous claims and parties, courts have struggled with joinder disincen-
tives in the face of realignment. In In re Olympic Mills, for instance, the 
First Circuit confronted the question of whether to realign intervening de-
fendants, who were suspiciously left out of the original litigation, as 
involuntary coplaintiffs, framing the case as a "factual and procedural knot 
of Gordian complexity.,,'58 While nothing in the record explains why the 
original, nondiverse plaintiff chose not to join the intervening defendants, 
the specter of realignment, given the appellate court's discussion, seems like 
a possible answer. Though ultimately refusing to realign the parties, the 
court recognized that 
the proper alignment of [the two defendants] becomes more than an aca-
demic exercise because the intervention of a nondiverse party as a plaintiff 
157. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1089 (6th Cir. 1992). 
158. 477 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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raises a suspicious judicial eyebrow .... [T]his is a close call (perhaps be-
cause it is difficult to quantify and compare the parties' competing and 
complex interests) .... 159 
Other courts have dealt with these complexities in similar fashion. '60 
C. Alternative Realignment Tests Failfor the Same Reason 
Courts and commentators have repeatedly criticized the doctrine of re-
alignment on numerous grounds. '61 Several have adopted or proposed 
alternative tests to current realignment analyses. The First Circuit uses both 
analyses in deciding the realignment question. '62 One commentator has pro-
posed a similar, two-part test based on footnote three of Indianapolis: 
"requir[ing] a court to (1) align the parties with respect to the primary pur-
pose of the suit, and (2) investigate any other conflicts that might justify 
aligning the parties differently.,,'63 Courts in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, 
meanwhile, sidestep Indianapolis, asking whether "the parties are aligned to 
match their actual interests.,,'64 Each of these alternative tests, however, still 
suffers from the same problems the principal purpose and substantial con-
troversy analyses suffer from, namely, jurisdictional infirmities and joinder 
disincentives. The problems with these alternative approaches, it seems, do 
not rest with the tests themselves, but with the problem of realignment in 
general. 
Each of the alternative tests still examines the merits of a case too 
deeply. As previously discussed, any reliance on principal purpose analysis, 
as is undertaken by the First Circuit and the "footnote three test," still forces 
courts to address the question of which of the plaintiff's claims is "princi-
pal" and which is "secondary," an inquiry which "depends on the outcome 
159. Id. at 12n.9. 
160. Krueger v. Cartwright, 996 F.2d 928, 932 n.5 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing the issue); Zurn 
Indus., Inc. v. Acton Constr. Co., 847 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1988) (juxtaposing the jurisdictional 
requirements for realignment and joinder); Reed v. Robilio, 376 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1967) ("The 
dispute here centers around the propriety of the test employed by the District Court in realigning the 
Bank. Appellant's contention is basically that the Bank, because of its antagonism--evidenced by its 
refusal to sue and by its joinder with defendants in affirmatively trying to defeat the claim asserted 
on its behalf-is properly a party defendant."); Prime Income Asset Mgmt Co. v. Waters Edge 
Living LLC, No. 3:07-CV-0102-D, 2007 WL 2229050, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007) 
("[R]ealignment to permit removal ... when a defendant has relied on improper joinder ... would 
impermissibly enable a removing defendant to substitute an 'ultimate interest' test for the typically 
more onerous burden imposed by the doctrine of improper joinder."); Fisherman's Harvest, Inc. v. 
United States, 74 Fed. CI. 681 (Fed. CI. 2006) (refusing to join parties as involuntary plaintiffs for 
similar reasons). 
161. E.g., Washington v. Ernster, 551 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2007); Schwartz v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-2049, 2001 WL 1622209 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18,2001); Hancock v. Nelson, No. 
C-97-1952 SI, 1997 WL 601431 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1997); Braverman, supra note 11; Everette, 
supra note 12, at 1979. 
162. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. 
163. Braverman, supra note 11, at 1119. 
164. Symes v. Harris, 472 F.3d 754, 761 (lOth Cir. 2006); see supra notes 109-111 and ac-
companying text. 
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of the litigation, which can hardly be used to determine jurisdiction.,,165 De-
termining the parties' "actual interests," meanwhile, resolves an issue that 
itself may be central to the substance of a case, such as corporate owner-
ship,l66 fraud,167 or inheritance. l68 Ruling on such issues first, and jurisdiction 
second, is surely worse than the principal purpose test alone. 
This illustrates the practical problem with any test for realignment. A re-
alignment test, by its very nature, runs afoul of the axiom that jurisdiction 
should be determined, whenever possible, as the threshold matter in a fed-
eral inquiry.169 Realignment analyses can be thought of as occupying a 
spectrum of how far a particular analysis demands the court look beyond the 
pleadings. At one extreme, an analysis requires the court to go as far as it 
can beyond the pleadings-to resolve the entire case-before realignment. 
At the other, an analysis requires that the court not look beyond the plead-
ings at all. Realignment analyses that require the court to resolve legal 
issues in contention, as in the first case, do violence to the notion of jurisdic-
tion as a threshold inquiry. An analysis on the other extreme of the 
spectrum, where courts are not required to examine any contested issues 
beyond the pleadings, can hardly be called realignment analysis at all: cases 
in which jurisdiction is in doubt from the pleadings can be summarily dis-
missed without resorting to any extra statutory analysis. In fact, such an 
analysis simply abrogates the rule announced in Indianapolis to " 'look be-
yond the pleadings.' ,,170 Any realignment test, therefore, must choose 
between rejecting the Supreme Court's directive to "'scrupulously confine 
their own jurisdiction,' ,,171 or rejecting the Supreme Court's directive to rear-
range the parties based on the "actualities of [the] litigation.',172 These 
competing commands force the lower courts to choose which Supreme 
Court directive to follow-and which to violate. 
Further, it is doubtful that a third test for realignment would somehow 
alter the disincentives for joinder inherent in the current doctrine of re-
alignment. Despite the approaches advanced by the First Circuie73 and the 
footnote three test,174 both rely on "[re]align[ing] the parties with respect to 
165. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 80 (1941) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added). 
166. See Symes, 472 F.3d at 761 (resolving "actual interests" based on disputed corporate 
ownership). 
167. See Tracy Broad. Corp. v. Spectrum Scan, LLC, No. 8:06-CV-336, 2007 WL 1825174, at 
*5 (D. Neb. June 22, 2007) (resolving "actual interests" by assuming plaintiff's complicity in its 
director's alleged fraud). 
168. See Fla. First Nat') Bank of Jacksonville v. Bagley, 508 F. Supp. 8, 10 (M.D. Fla. 1980) 
(resolving "actual interests" based on a contested will). 
169. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). 
170. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69 (citation omitted). 
171. Id. at 77 (citation omitted). 
172. Id. at 70. 
173. See supra notes 103--106 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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the primary purpose of the suit.,,175 Joinder of a claim or party that may ap-
pear to alter the primary purpose of the suit disincentivizes forum-mindful 
parties from engaging in joinder if it would affect jurisdiction, no matter 
how robust the secondary analysis. Criticism that litigants will undervalue 
this risk forgets about those litigants whose cases are inordinately complex, 
and whose forum preferences are extremely strong. While robust issue 
analysis with respect to joinder incentives is certainly better than analysis 
predicated on a single issue posture, realignment analyses invariably weigh 
claims relative to each other, often forcing courts to examine some contro-
versies as "secondary" relative to a "single issue." 
At this point, where the Courts of Appeals engage in four different tests 
for realignment, and commentators have seriously proposed yet another, it 
seems wholly unrealistic to believe that an additional realignment test 
would cure the federal courts of the jurisdictional illness of realignment. 
New treatments, in the form of statutory amendments to title 28, have come 
along since Indianapolis that now give the federal courts the power-that 
Indianapolis sought-to curb the abuse of jurisdiction. Reliance on these 
obviates the need for Indianapolis-and for courts to seriously consider 
realignment. 
III. CURRENT JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES PROVIDE EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
TO THE PROBLEM OF REALIGNMENT 
Ultimately, the discretion Indianapolis afforded courts exacerbates, 
rather than solves, the problem of diversity jurisdictional abuse. Lower 
courts looking to free themselves of this problem, however, must grapple 
with the decision's weight as binding authority. Simply ignoring the deci-
sion, no matter its practical effects, does harm to the principles of precedent 
and stare decisis prevalent in American jurisprudence. Since the opinion's 
release, Congress has amended several jurisdictional statutes that appear to 
apply to the problem of realignment. A much more elegant solution, there-
fore, could be obtained by appropriately using these statutes to rid the courts 
of cases in which realignment is sought. This has the effect of circumvent-
ing Indianapolis without ignoring it. 
Such a method has several advantages: First, the lower courts need not 
worry about upsetting Supreme Court precedent; the solution is a work-
around to the problems invited by Indianapolis, not an overhaul of the entire 
court-designed doctrine. Second, courts need not engage at all in the proce-
dure of party realignment, a process which offends the judicial sensibilities of 
many courts. 176 And third, in contrast to complicated tests or analyses, the pro-
cedure involved in relying on the statutes described is a clean, powerful, and 
effective method to combat diversity jurisdiction abuse. Unlike Indianapolis, 
175. Braverman, supra note II, at 1119. 
176. See, e.g., Washington v. Ernster, 551 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2007); Schwartz v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-2049, 2001 WL 1622209 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18.2001); Hancock v. Nelson, 
No. C-97-1952 SI, 1997 WL 601431 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1997). 
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which relied too much on the courts' determination of intangibles, such as a 
party's "wants,,177 and "attitude,,,178 the courts' application of these jurisdic-
tional statutes focuses only on the pleadings. Used appropriately, this 
method would give federal courts the opportunity to free themselves of the 
troublesome doctrines of realignment. 
A. 28 U.S.c. § 1359: Defining Realignment as an "Improper" 
Invocation of Jurisdiction 
One of the Court's primary concerns in Indianapolis was the potential 
for manufactured diversity jurisdiction in multiparty litigation: the possibil-
ity that plaintiffs would either "misjoin" or conveniently leave out parties to 
the alleged conflict simply to ensure complete diversity.179 At the time of 
Indianapolis, the statute proscribing misjoinder limited dismissal to in-
stances where a party wrongly assigned its interest to another for the 
purposes of securing, or evading, diversity jurisdiction.180 Thus, there existed 
many instances where, although parties were intentionally misjoined for the 
purpose of manufacturing diversity jurisdiction, the court had no statutory 
ability to deny the suit jurisdiction because no assignment of interests had 
occurred. 181 Realignment, therefore, may have seemed like an appropriate 
way to combat this by depriving the plaintiff of the very statutory right he 
sought to abuse. 
Revisions to title 28 of the United States Code since Indianapolis now 
provide the federal courts with powerful tools to combat abuses of party 
alignment and joinder. In particular, § 1359, amended seven years after 
177. Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 74. 
178. Id. at 75 n.4 (citing Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199,204 (1918». 
179. See id. at 69 ("The specific question is this: Does an alignment of the parties in relation 
to their real interests in the 'matter in controversy' satisfy the settled requirements of diversity juris-
diction ?"). 
180. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § II, 1 Stat. 73, 79; see also Comment, Chaos of Jurisdic-
tion in the Federal District Courts, 35 ILL. L. REV. 566, 569-71 (1941). 
181. See, e.g., In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 99-100 (1908) (" 'There is no 
collusion apparent in any legal sense. It is of course manifest that complainants and defendants were 
entirely in accord and arranged together that the suit should be brought in the Federal court and that 
the averments of the bill should be admitted by the answer. But there was no colorable assignment 
of some claim to a citizen of another State, nor any misrepresentation or distortion of facts to mis-
lead the court.'" (citation omitted»; Benedict v. Seiberling, 17 F.2d 841, 853 (N.D. Ohio 1927) 
("Collusion in the sense of fraud does not necessarily exist even if the plaintiff's justiciable interest 
was manipulated into existence and action thereon incited by a defendant .... "); Harris v. Brown, 6 
F.2d 922, 926 (W.D. Ky. 1925) (quoting In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. at 99-100); 
Stephens v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 F. 759,765 (N.D. Ohio 1917) (''There is no evidence of collu-
sion between the parties in this case; that the original parties may be friendly antagonists is not, 
however, improbable. Counsel's surmise may be correct, but something more than this is necessary 
to make their 'collusion' reprehensible."); see also Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1104 (4th 
Cir. 1969) (concluding that although misjoinder of receiver was not legally an assignment, "[w]e 
think his appointment for the purpose of creating apparent diversity of citizenship was an improper 
manufacture of jurisdiction within the meaning of § 1359 [which post-dates Indianapolis]. Any 
other interpretation would render a portion of the statute impotent because it was clearly intended 
for the statute to apply to manufactured situations created by other means than assignments."). 
554 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 107:525 
Indianapolis in 1948, relieves the district courts of jurisdiction "in which 
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively 
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.,,182 The modification, 
specifically including "or otherwise," was created to avoid the very situa-
tions described above. 183 Where such improprieties have occurred, courts 
dd h · 184 d'd h' b . 185 E maya ress t e Issue sua sponte or eCI e t e Issue y motIOn. xam-
pies of parties "improperly or collusively made or jOined,,186 may include an 
assignment of claims between a corporation's directors and the corporate 
body,187 a private settlement between a plaintiff and defendant of the same 
state,188 and a case in which the plaintiff has" 'no real intention in good faith 
to prosecute the action against the defendant or seek a joint judgment.' ,,189 It 
is unclear whether such cases could have been dismissed for "collusion" 
prior to the 1948 amendment. 
The statute grants the federal courts broad powers to deal with diversity 
cases in which party alignment or joinder appears suspect. Congress placed 
no limit on which parties fell under § 1359's purview: "any party" includes 
parties improperly or collusively joined as either plaintiffs or defendants. 19o 
Nor does the statute mandate a time period for the addition of the misjoined 
parties: they may have been "made" as part of the original complaint, 191 or 
"joined" by amendment. 192 Once a case falls under the ambit of the statute, 
§ 1359 delivers a powerful remedy: the district court must dismiss the entire 
action rather than sever the misjoined parties. 193 This is not discretionary: the 
court "shall not have jurisdiction of [the] civil action" in such a case.194 The 
statute's historical notes give credence to these interpretive intuitions, stat-
182. 28 U.S.c. § 1359 (2000) (emphasis added). 
183. See, e.g., Edgar E. Bethell & Herschel Friday, The Federal Judicial Code of 1948, 3 ARK. 
L. REv. 146, 147 (1949); James William Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: 
Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV. I, II (1964). 
184. E.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925,935-36 (2d 
Cir.1998). 
185. E.g., Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1995). 
186. 28 U.S.c. § 1359. 
187. Airlines Reporting Corp., 58 F.3d at 863. 
188. E.g., Walk Haydel & Assocs. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 934 F. Supp. 209, 212 (E.D. 
La. 1996). 
189. Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Goldberg v. 
CPC Int'l, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233, 239 (N.D. Cal. 1980)) (concluding, however, that improper join-
der existed on other grounds). 
190. E.g., Smallwood v. III. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (collusive joining of 
a defendant); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1986) (collusive joining of a 
plaintiff). 
191. E.g., Airlines Reporting Corp., 58 F.3d 857. 
192. E.g., Hillman, 796 F.2d 770. 
193. See Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 70 F.3d 640, 642-43 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[Sec-
tionJI359 barred jurisdiction-not only over plaintiffs' claim but over the entire action .... "). 
194. 28 U.S.c. § 1359 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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ing that § 1359's "coverage against collusive jurisdiction is unlimited, and 
its approach is direct.,,195 
One judicially created doctrine, "fraudulent joinder," provides the courts 
with some power to combat some of the abuses § 1359 sought to curb. In 
general, fraudulent joinder comes in two forms: "when there is no possibil-
ity that a plaintiff can state a cause of action against nondiverse defendants 
in state court, or where there has been outright fraud in a plaintiff's pleading 
of jurisdictional facts.,,196 If a federal court concludes that parties have been 
fraudulently joined, it has discretion to remove the offending parties from 
the action and accept the jurisdictionally appropriate remainder. 197 Although 
it may appear that fraudulent joinder carries the same punch as § 1359, the 
doctrine addresses only a limited set of circumstances. First, unlike § 1359, 
its use does not strip federal courts of jurisdiction, but rather serves as an 
exception to the complete diversity requirement. 198 And second, its applica-
tion is generally confined to cases where a party objects to its removal to 
federal court. 199 This does not mean, however, that § 1359 makes the use of 
fraudulent joinder moot. Where parties have engaged in "outright fraud in 
[the] pleading of jurisdictional facts,,,200 fraudulent joinder can clarify and 
remedy § 1359's ambiguities. 
Courts should consider using fraudulent joinder and § 1359 complemen-
tarily in an effort to avoid party realignment based on language from 
Indianapolis. An example best illustrates the possibilities: imagine the hypo-
thetical from before concerning A's condo frre. 201 Now, A sues Band C in 
state court, and C attempts to remove to federal court on a theory of re-
alignment. C desires to have B realigned as party-plaintiff with A such that 
complete diversity exists. B, however, has not lodged a claim against C. 
Thus if the court were to accept C's proposed alignment, it would establish 
an action where potential plaintiff B does not have a claim against defendant 
C. This, however, would create a situation in which there is no controversy 
between a plaintiff and a defendant. The court, therefore, should consider 
the action as one falling within the ambit of § 1359: through C's motion for 
realignment, B has, in essence, become a "party ... improperly or collu-
sively made ... to invoke the jurisdiction of [the] court.,,202 It seems well 
within the bounds of reasonable statutory interpretation to suggest that 
shuffling a party from defendant to plaintiff, who has no claim against any 
defendant, is a "party ... improperly or collusively made.,,203 Indeed, courts 
195. /d. his!. & revision nn. 
196. Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co., 990 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993). 
197. E.g., In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2006). 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. Gottlieb, 990 F.2d at 327. 
20 I. See supra Section II. A. I. 
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000). 
203. ld. 
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can invoke this statute anytime a party proposes a realignment structure 
which would place one claimless party against any opposing party. It should 
be noted, however, that § 1359's language confines it to cases in which a 
party attempts to wrongly "invoke the jurisdiction of [the] court.,,204 Thus, 
where, after proper removal to federal court, a plaintiff moves for realign-
ment in an attempt to destroy diversity, § 1359 provides no power to federal 
courts. 
At least one court has taken this approach. In Prime Income Asset Man-
agement Co. v. Waters Edge Living, the defendants removed the case to 
federal court in diversity on a theory of realignment.205 After a lengthy dis-
cussion, the court found that the proposed realignment itself would 
constitute improper joinder, and generally questioned whether "realignment 
... is procedurally proper under circumstances such as these.,,206 The court 
declined the invitation to hold "realignment ... procedurally proper when a 
defendant has relied on improper joinder to remove a case based on diver-
sity jurisdiction. This would impermissibly enable a removing defendant to 
substitute an 'ultimate interest' test for the typically more onerous burden 
imposed by the doctrine of improper joinder.,,207 As a result, the court re-
manded the entire action back to state court. 
Unfortunately, courts are generally hesitant to intertwine realignment 
with determinations of improper and fraudulent joinder. Cases have recently 
found the two intellectually distinct, asking first whether the parties have 
been improperly or fraudulently joined, and second whether the current 
party alignment mandates realignment.208 The problem this thinking im-
poses-besides retaining the vestige of realignment-is that it focuses on 
the limited number of circumstances in which parties in the original action 
have not been improperly aligned but do require realignment. Section 1359 
and Prime Income Asset Management, meanwhile, provide a much more 
elegant solution, which courts would do well to adopt. 
B. 28 U.S.c. § 1332( c)( 1): Expanding the Concept of a "Direct Action" 
Against Insurers to Ensure Incomplete Diversity 
A significant number of cases involving party realignment involve insur-
ance actions. One search suggests that over the past ten years, forty-three 
percent of all realignment cases have had at least one insurance company as 
a named party.209 Of these cases, 100% were brought to federal court on the 
204. [d. (emphasis added). 
205. No. 3:07-CV-0102-D, 2007 WL 2229050, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007). 
206. [d. at *4. 
207. [d. 
208. E.g., Walker v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 5:06CVI7-DCB-JMR, 2006 WL 
2975486 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 17,2006); Roblez v. Ramos, No. Civ.A. 30ICV0366-G, 2001 WL 896942 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 1,2001). 
209. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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basis of diversity jurisdiction.210 This significant trend in the types of cases 
where realignment is sought has not gone unnoticed by commentators.211 
Fortunately, Congress has not been enthusiastic as of late about allowing 
run-of-the-mill insurance cases on the federal docket. In particular, Con-
gress amended the diversity statute itself in 1964 by adding subsection c, 
which, for jurisdictional purposes, made an insurance company a citizen of 
the opposing party's state as well as its own in a "direct action" against it.212 
Title 28, section 1332(c)(I) states: 
[I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability 
insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the in-
sured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a 
citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State 
by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has its 
principal place of business .... 213 
This was in direct response to a bizarre quirk in Louisiana law which al-
lowed an injured party to bring suit against a tortfeasor's insurance company 
without joining the tortfeasor.214 Because of the dearth of homegrown insur-
ance companies, and because plaintiffs' lawyers disliked Louisiana's 
liberally applied judicial review of jury verdicts, this virtually ensured that 
every tort above the amount-in-controversy committed in Louisiana against 
a party with out-of-state insurance found its way to federal court.215 
While 28 U.S.c. § 1332(c)(l) would seem to automatically dispose of 
the realignment cases described, its power is constrained on two fronts: first, 
§ 1332(c)(l) only applies to "direct actions"; and second, the insured cannot 
be joined as a party-defendant. While the latter provision is set in stone, the 
former is more flexible. Since the subsection's enactment in 1964, courts 
have struggled to precisely define the contours of a "direct action." Despite 
the passage of almost fifty years since the statute's enactment, the current 
definition of "direct action" under § 1332(c)(l) seems little more than a 
patchwork quilt of procedural circumstances, haphazardly weighed for their 
"directness.,,216 
210. This was determined through an examination of the thirty-one cases found from the 
database search described supra note 12. 
21!. See, e.g., Everette, supra note 12, at 1979 ("It is difficult to imagine that the Founding 
Fathers intended [diversity jurisdiction] to allow deep-pocketed insurance companies to utilize the 
federal courts to their advantage."). 
212. Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439, 78 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(I) (2000)). 
213. 28 U.S.c. § 1332(c)(I) (2000). 
214. S. REP. No. 88-1308, at 4,7 (1964). 
215. [d. at 4. 
216. See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, 1., 
dissenting) (attempting to define "direct action" by defining" 'directness' ... as [an action] between the 
injured claimant and the insurer"); Campbell v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977); Fid. & 
Deposit Co. of Md. v. S. Utils., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 692, 693 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (quoting Campbell, 552 
F.2d at 605). 
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With this in mind, an expansion of the concept of a "direct action" could 
help federal courts dispose of many realignment cases. Because Congress's 
intention in adding the clause to the diversity statute was to avoid the situa-
tion in which the "federal courts [have become] protectors [of] insurance 
companies,,,217 it seems particularly apt that the same words should now be 
read to satisfy the same purpose. In fact, where the tortfeasor is not added as 
a party-defendant, as is the case when applying § 1332(c)(l), the term "di-
rect" becomes superfluous for any case in which the plaintiff "directly" sues 
an adverse insurer. The Fifth Circuit held as much in O.M. Greene Livestock 
Co. v. Azalea Meats, Inc., finding the plaintiff's action "direct" even after 
the insurer's beneficiaries, insured defendants under § 1332(c)(l), dropped 
out of the litigation.2lB Thus, at least where insurance companies are in-
volved, this approach would give federal courts statutory authority to 
dispose of cases sought to be realigned. 
An example illustrates this possibility: imagine, again, the condo fire 
hypothetical. A sues Band C in state court; C removes to federal court on a 
realignment theory that would make B a party-plaintiff. Relying on 
§ 1332(c)(1), the court could deny the realignment on the theory that re-
alignment itself would create a "direct action." That, in tum, would make 
the resulting case jurisdictionally infirm. If the court were to take up the 
realignment argument, the court may stress that the case would: (1) not pos-
sess an insured party-defendant, since B is sought to be made a party-
plaintiff, and (2) constitute a "direct action" against a liability insurer since 
it is B, after all, who holds the insurance policy for A. This would run afoul 
of § 1332(c)(1), and C's attempts to bring the case against it into federal 
court on a theory of diversity jurisdiction should ultimately fail. In the end, 
using § 1332(c)(l) to dispose of realignment cases, such as the one above, 
requires some tinkering with the ambiguous phrase "direct action." But con-
sidering Congress's intent in adding the provision, and the problems 
inherent in realignment, the effort seems well worth it. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of realignment should simply be completely abandoned. 
After sixty-seven years, the doctrine is wholly unworkable. The present state 
of the law has become so fractionated and free-form that strategy has won 
over both practicality and common sense. Both the principal purpose and 
substantial controversy tests require federal courts to resolve difficult, sub-
stantive issues merely to address the diversity statute's simple, two-part 
scheme, and further discourage parties from using joinder where the rules 
otherwise allow. Nor does it seem apparent how some third test would alle-
viate this suffering. Fortunately, because of statutory enactments since 
217. Lumbennen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). 
218. 516 F.2d 509,510 (5th Cir. 1975) ('This Court has given [§ 1332(c)(I)] the broad into:r-
pretation it deserves in light of the hann Congress sought to remedy."). 
December 2008] The End of Realignment 559 
Indianapolis, the federal courts now possess the authority to execute another 
solution. By creatively implementing various jurisdictional procedures un-
der 28 U.S.c. § 1359, characterizing realignments as "improper joinder"; 
and 28 U.S.c. § 1332(c)(1), expanding the concept of a "direct action," the 
federal courts may finally free themselves from the ill effects of a century of 
litigation. 
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